fansincemckay
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fansincemckay

Points Member, 4, from in a cucks head

me Mar 8, 2019

fansincemckay was last seen:
Oct 30, 2020 at 12:56 AM
    1. fansincemckay
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      fansincemckay
      The two most important days of your life,the day you were born, and the day you discover WHY.
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  • About

    Birthday:
    Jan 1, 2016 (Age: 4)
    Location:
    in a cucks head
    Occupation:
    kicker of soyboy ass
    Security duties performed by Air Police, Security Police and Security Forces include securing aircraft on flightlines, priority resources in Weapons Storage Areas and missile field security.

    The Aerospace Systems Security Program was built upon base and site security operations and these two operations shared three principles: All security programs existed to “counteract the analyzed threat of enemy action;” all security programs would share a “uniform and specific priority structure;” and across the Air Force “a high order of standardization in security doctrine, procedures, facilities, and terms will prevail.” The “uniform and specific priority structure” established by AFM 207-1 classified aerospace systems as Priority A, B, and C.

    Priority A systems were strategic bombers and tactical and air defense fighter aircraft in “cocked” status on alert, armed and ready to launch; alert refueling and electronic countermeasures aircraft; alert aircrews and aerospace ground equipment (AGE) used for starting engines on alert aircraft; missiles on strategic alert and on-duty missile combat crews and facilities essential to their launch; nuclear weapons storage sites; and components of command and control and early warning systems. Regardless of classification, priority resources were to be segregated in restricted areas subject to entry control procedures.

    Certain Priority A resources also required close security areas within the restricted area. For example, for Priority A aircraft on the ramp, the close security area perimeter was required to be established “not closer than 10 feet nor farther than wing tip distance from the fuselage.”40 The close security area perimeter was the innermost line of security control; even the aircraft’s guards were not allowed across that line. Only the aircraft commander could authorize entry into the close security area. When nuclear weapons were involved, whether loaded aboard an aircraft or not, a “no lone” zone could be designated in accordance with AFR 122-4.

    Inside a “no lone” zone, the “Two-Man System” applied and no individual was allowed inside the zone unless accompanied by another. The “Two-Man System” was primarily a nuclear safety/reliability requirement and Air Police officers were reminded by headquarters that ensuring compliance was not a primary responsibility of the Air Police. Priority A and B resource restricted areas required entry control procedures. Because of the nature of the resource entry control procedures were the strictest for Priority A. To enter these areas two things were needed: verifiable authority and verifiable identity. Those personnel who required routine access to a restricted area could be issued a badge allowing unescorted entry; otherwise, a temporary pass requiring an escort could be issued if the individual was vouched for by someone authorized to do so. Two verification systems were used. The exchange badge system involved two identical restricted area badges with one worn by the individual and the other kept in the entry control point (ECP). When the individual desired entry he exchanged his badge for the one in the ECP after the sentry on duty compared the two. The single badge procedure required the ECP controller to verify the photograph and physical description on the badge with the individual’s features.

    Two up channel reports were provided to cover incidents involving aerospace systems. The first, nicknamed HELPING HAND, was used to report a hostile or possibly hostile event had been detected at a base or site. If investigation confirmed or reasonably established enemy action at the base or site, emergency security operations were to be initiated and a COVERED WAGON report sent to higher headquarters.42 Although not part of the AFM 207-1 lexicon, an incident involving the compromise of a nuclear weapon was codenamed BROKEN ARROW. These standardized reports replaced the SEVEN HIGH reports previously used to report a weapons system security violation.